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ABSTRACT  State ownership is an important phenomenon in the world economy, especially 3 
in transition economies. Previous research has focused on how state ownership influences 4 
organizational performance, but few studies have been conducted on how state ownership 5 
influences employees. I propose that different ownership structures trigger different 6 
relational models among employees, who pay attention to organizational justice consistent 7 
with their model to guide their extra-role behavior. Specifically, state-owned organizations 8 
reinforce employees’ relational concern and direct employees’ attention to procedural 9 
justice, whereas privatized organizations highlight employees’ instrumental concern and 10 
direct their attention to distributive justice. I leverage a sample of organizations in China 11 
to explore how different ownership structures activate different relational models among 12 
employees and alter the relationship between organizational justice and employees’ 13 
extra-role behaviors. I find that state ownership attenuates and even reverses the positive 14 
relationship between distributive justice and extra-role behaviors. Conversely, state 15 
ownership exaggerates the positive relationship between a critical procedural justice 16 
dimension (participation in decision making) and employee extra-role behaviors. 17 
Implications for the micro-foundations of corporate governance and institutional change, 18 
organizational justice literature, and cross-cultural research are developed. This study also 19 
generates new insights for transition economies such as China. 20 
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INTRODUCTION 23 
Ownership structure is a key characteristic of corporate governance and holds 24 
important implications for organizational strategy and productivity (Hill & Snell, 25 
1989). State ownership – the degree to which an organization’s property interest 26 
is vested in the state or a public body representing the state – is still an important 27 
phenomenon in the world economy (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 28 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) contribute approximately 10% of the worlds’ 29 
GDP (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015) and still exist in countries 30 
including the United States, Germany, France, Italy, China, Brazil (Pargendler, 31 
2012), Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, 32 
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33 Norway, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Egypt, Serbia, Turkey, Bhutan,  
34 Chile, Ghana, Kenya, India, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Zambia, Korea, and  
35 many other countries (World Bank, 2014). Therefore, Peng, Bruton, Stan, and  
36 Huang (2016) suggest that state ownership is one of the mainstream organizational  
37 forms and holds important implications for organizational theories. Existing  
38 research on state ownership has focused on its implications for organizational  
39 performance (Le & O’Brien, 2010; Ramaswamy, 2001) and found that state  
40 ownership  is  on  average  associated  with  decreased  labor  productivity  and  
41 corporate performance (Chen, 2001; Xu & Wang, 1999). However, privatization  
42 reform, which aims to reduce state ownership, has only achieved mixed results  
43 (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). Because employees are an important  
44 stakeholder of organizations and driver of organizational performance (Aguilera & 
 
45 Jackson, 2010), how state ownership and its reduction influence employee behavior  
46 may provide a clue about the transition effect. However, very few studies have  
47 paid attention to their experiences under state ownership (Fiss, 2008). Therefore,  
48 more research is needed on the micro foundation of ownership reform (Cuervo  
49 & Villalonga, 2000; Parker, 1995). A few micro studies found that employees in  
50 SOEs prefer egalitarian distribution (He, Chen, & Zhang, 2004) and perform  
51 extra-role behaviors that align with SOEs’ goals (Farh, Zhong, & Organ, 2004).  
52 However, it is unclear what motives drive SOE employees to engage in extra-  
53 role behaviors. To fill this gap, this study focuses on how organizations with  
54 different ownership structure motivate employee behavior that is important for  
55 organizational performance – extra-role behavior.  
56 In  this  study,  I  propose  that  SOEs  rely  on  a  distinctive  mechanism  to  
57 motivate employees’ extra-role behavior. SOEs foster a strong collective identity  
58 among employees and encourage them to treat their enterprises as families.  
59 This objective is achieved through widespread participation in organizational  
60 governance. As the reform emphasizing market efficiency and organizational  
61 productivity proceeds, privatized companies reinforce employees’ concern about  
62 their individual outcomes and utilize equitable allocation of outcomes to motivate  
63 employees.  Thus,  employees  in  SOEs  and  privatized  companies  will  hold  
64 different relational models about their relationships with their organizations and  
65 pay attention to organizational practice that is consistent with their relational  
66 model. In particular, I suggest that the communitarian and egalitarian relational  
67 model in SOEs accentuates positive reactions to procedural justice, whereas  
68 the market and exchange relational model in privatized companies accentuates  
69 positive reactions to distributive justice. To test this argument, the present  
70 research draws upon the variability in ownership structure of organizations  
71 during China’s transition to explore how ownership structure moderates the  
72 effects of distributive justice and procedural justice on employees’ extra-role  
73 behavior.  
74 The current work contributes to existing theory and research in a number  
75 of  ways.  First,  I  bridge  micro  and  macro  research  on  China’s  economic 
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reform (Naughton, 1996; Ramamurti, 2000), developing a theory regarding 76 
how ownership structure influences employee relational model and reactions to 77 
organizational practices. This is key to understanding the micro-foundations of 78 
institutional reform. I suggest that ownership structure is not associated with 79 
different levels of employee motivation (Burawoy & Lukacs, 1985), but rather 80 
associated with different predictors of employee motivation. Thus, whether these 81 
differences are acknowledged and addressed properly during the transition may 82 
help explain the mixed results of transition effects in macro research.  83 
Second, by exploring how ownership structure serves as a key contextual 84 
factor  altering  the  well-known relationship between organizational justice 85 
and extra-role behavior, I offer new insights into the boundary conditions 86 
of  justice  effects.  Because  different  ownership  structures  rely  on  different 87 
approaches to motivate employees, it will shape which mechanism of justice is 88 
operative – social exchange or social identity. Specifically, distributive justice, by 89 
emphasizing equitable allocation of outcomes, is especially important in soliciting 90 
employee extra-role behavior in privatized organizations. Procedural justice, by 91 
verifying individuals’ collective identity, plays an important role in state-owned 92 
organizations. Thus, I show how different justice dimensions matter in different 93 
contexts.     94 
Finally, this study holds important implications for designing reform measures 95 
in transition economies. Previous reform efforts are based on the assumption 96 
that SOE managers and employees lack incentives and motivation, and the 97 
main reform measure is to privatize SOEs. This study uncovers an unrecognized 98 
predictor of employee extra-role behavior in SOEs. I suggest that SOEs do not 99 
simply lack motivation but motivate employees in different ways than privatized 100 
organizations. Recognizing this new motive can generate more creative ways to 101 
reform and manage SOEs, given the increasing presence of state ownership around 102 
the globe (The Economist, 2012).     103 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES  104 
In this article, I propose that ownership structure is associated with the relational 105 
model that individuals hold regarding their relationships with their organizations 106 
and their primary concerns in organizations. Ownership structure and the role 107 
of labor are two important dimensions in corporate governance (Aguilera & 108 
Jackson, 2010). Because ownership structure defines the social relations among 109 
organizational actors (Fiss, 2008), it will influence how employees construe their 110 
relationships with their organizations. In addition, ownership structure shapes 111 
organizational goals (Fiss, 2008), which will influence the primary concerns among 112 
employees. For instance, a state owner focuses more on organizational solidarity 113 
and treats workers as ‘master of enterprises’ (Chiu, 2006), whereas private owners 114 
may focus more on organizational productivity and treat labor as a means to 115 
achieve organizational productivity. Thus, their relative weights in the ownership 116 
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117 structure of organizations will influence how employees construe their relationships 
 
118 with their organizations – as enterprise master or exchange partners – and  
119 whether they are primarily concerned with social identity or exchange outcomes.  
120 The relational schemas that employees hold and their primary concerns will  
121 direct their attention to different organizational practices (Thornton, Ocasio, &  
122 Lounsbury, 2012), with implications for which form of justice is important for  
123 guiding employee extra-role behavior. I selected China as the empirical setting  
124 to examine this proposal because its transition from planned economy to market  
125 economy generates great diversity in the ownership structure of organizations.  
126 In the context of China, I suggest that state ownership and privatization reform  
127 activate different relational models people apply to their organizations. These  
128 relational models are the cognitive schemas that people use to process complex  
129 information and guide their actions. These cognitive schemas are constructed in a  
130 specific institutional environment and mediate the impact of institutions on human 
 
131 behaviors (Seo & Creed, 2002). Therefore, only one or a few relational models  
132 are salient in a specific context, and economic development generally moves the  
133 relational model from communal sharing to market pricing (Fiske, 1992). Eco-  
134 nomic development generally moves the relational schema from communal sharing 
 
135 to market pricing (Fiske, 1992). Applying this theory to employee-organization  
136 relationships in China, I argue that the communal sharing model is dominant in  
137 SOEs, and the market pricing model is dominant in privatized companies. The  
138 following sections will develop these arguments based on previous research. 
 
 
139 State Ownership in China 
 
140 State ownership is an important characteristic of China’s pre-reform socialist  
141 economy. China adopted the Soviet model shortly after its revolution (Jackson,  
142 1992), leading SOEs to play a central role in the composition of its planned  
143 economy (Groves, Yongmiao, McMillan, & Naughton, 1994). State ownership  
144 is associated with obligations and privileges that have evolved historically. In  
145 particular, SOEs have alternative goals beyond financial performance, such  
146 as maintaining political stability, increasing employment, and providing public  
147 facilities (Walder, 1989; Zif, 1981). In conjunction with these obligations, they  
148 have greater access to government loans and purchases and face softer budget  
149 constraints (Bai & Wang, 1998; Dong & Putterman, 2003). The incentive system  
150 of SOEs has been historically characterized by high social benefits and low cash  
151 wages (Walder, 1983), both of which are allocated equally within classes of workers  
152 (Giacobbe-Miller, Miller, & Zhang, 1997). SOEs also provide employment security  
153 and used to grant all employees lifelong employment until retirement (Naughton,  
154 1996). SOE employees have more secure employment than employees of non-state-  
155 owned organizations (Gong & Chang, 2008).  
156 SOEs’ equal treatment of workers in their need satisfaction foster a communal  
157 sharing schema (Fiske, 1992) in which those within a group are not differentiated 
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and taken care of by the group. Based on interviews with 30 employees and a 158 
survey of 500 employees of two SOEs in northeast China, Liu (2003) found that 159 
SOEs emphasize group solidarity and treat employees as families. This family 160 
culture is further intensified by the socialist ideology, which regards workers as 161 
the ‘leading class’ and ‘master of socialist society’ (Wang & Greenwood, 2015). 162 
This ideology cultivated a collective identity of SOE employees as the ‘master of 163 
enterprises’ (zhurenweng) (Chiu, 2006). This identity is manifested in their reactions 164 
to unemployment. Due to their sense of class status and entitlement, laid-off 165 
workers prevalently experienced loss of face and a sense of betrayal (Mok, Wong, 166 
& Lee, 2002; Wang & Greenwood, 2015), and state workers resorted to this 167 
identity to defend their rights and resist SOEs’ downsizing effort, as illustrated 168 
in interviews with eight steel SOEs throughout China in 1997 (Hassard, Morris, 169 
Sheehan, & Yuxin, 2006). SOEs’ family culture and collective identity have 170 
been acknowledged by private companies during their acquisition of SOEs, as 171 
documented in a case study (Xing & Liu, 2016). The above studies unanimously 172 
show that SOEs activate a communal sharing relational model among SOE 173 
employees, as reflected in their culture and collective identity as ‘master of 174 
enterprises’.  175 
A very important institutional embodiment of that identity is the widespread 176 
participation opportunities of SOE employees in the governance of SOEs. 177 
SOEs institutionalize widespread employee participation in organizational affairs 178 
through daily production meetings, yearly workers’ congress, various management 179 
committees,  and  incentive-suggestion  systems  (Tang,  1993;  Walder,  1981). 180 
Although these participation opportunities are limited by central planning and 181 
party control over leadership selection (Walder, 1981), they still have a symbolic 182 
function of enhancing the communal sharing model in SOEs. Based on case 183 
studies of six enterprises in Shanghai from 1997 to 1998, Benson and Zhu (1999) 184 
found that SOEs are characterized by traditional management systems including 185 
teamwork,  information  sharing,  and  harmonious  work  conditions.  In  these 186 
organizations, unions and work congress participate in important organizational 187 
decision making, including redundancy decisions, organizational restructuring, 188 
developing training, and welfare and housing. In addition, employee creativity 189 
is recognized as an asset during ownership transformation, and employees can 190 
receive shares or form new companies based on their adopted ideas (Benson & 191 
Zhu, 1999). Participation opportunity has become so deeply grounded in SOE 192 
employees’ model that they rely on it to evaluate new management practices. 193 
For instance, a study of 194 employees from four SOEs in northeast China 194 
in 2008 showed that procedural justice, especially being able to participate in 195 
the performance appraisal process, is very important for employees’ perception 196 
of the system (Tsai & Wang, 2013). Therefore, procedural justice, especially 197 
the  opportunity  to  participate  in  organizational  decision  making,  plays  an 198 
important role in upholding SOE employees’ collective identity and sustaining 199 
their motivation.  200 
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201 Gradualist Reform in China 
 
202 China’s economy has experienced an unprecedented change as it transitions from  
203 a centrally-planned socialist economy to a market-oriented capitalist economy  
204 (Guthrie, 1999). However, the capitalist economy in China is centrally-managed  
205 capitalism, where the state plays an important role in many aspects of the  
206 economy (Lin, 2011). Under this background, ownership reform in China adopts a  
207 gradualist approach, with SOEs coexisting with organizations of hybrid ownership 
 
208 (Nee, 1992). For example, SOEs are partially privatized via public listing on  
209 stock exchanges, building joint ventures with local or foreign private firms, or  
210 transferring property rights to private holders (Walder, 1995). Analogous to other  
211 gradual reforms in China, this privatization reform is only a partial one in  
212 the sense that the state remains as a dominant shareholder in many privatized  
213 firms. Typically, public listing of SOEs allows the state to retain between 40%  
214 and 50% of the company’s shares. Between 20% and 30% of the shares are  
215 designated for institutional shares, and the remaining 30% are designated for  
216 public consumption as free-floating shares (Guthrie, 1999; Xu & Wang, 1999). 
In  
217 joint ventures, foreign parent companies often control half or more of the shares  
218 of joint ventures, and state-owned parent companies hold the other half or less  
219 (Guthrie, 1999). These privatized companies constitute an important sector in  
220 China’s economy (Walder, 2011). The privatization reform abolished privileges  
221 provided by the government, tightened budget constraints, and increased market  
222 pressure in privatized companies (Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). As a  
223 result, privatized companies place a higher priority on efficiency and productivity 
 
224 as organizational goals than SOEs do (He et al., 2004).  
225 Along with change in ownership structure, management practices of privatized  
226 companies are different from SOEs as well. The capitalist market exchanges  
227 human activities based on prices generated from market competition (Friedland  
228 & Alford, 1991). Under this logic, privatized companies allocate rewards based  
229 on individual performance and contribution to the organization (Giacobbe-Miller, 
 
230 Miller, Zhang, & Victorov, 2003), provide opportunities for career advancement  
231 to motivate their employees (Gong & Chang, 2008), and use meritocracy as  
232 the basis for promotion (Zhao & Zhou, 2004). That is, the incentive system of  
233 privatized organizations follows the rule of equity (Chen, Meindl, & Hui, 1998).  
234 Although SOEs are also increasingly adopting these labor practices, such as  
235 bonus payment and piece-rate wages (Groves et al., 1994; Keister, 2002), their  
236 movement towards a modern human resource management system is constrained  
237 by government involvement and union strength (Benson & Zhu, 1999). According  
238 to a survey of 600 Chinese companies in 2003, SOEs adopt less strategic human  
239 resource management practices than foreign-invested enterprises and private-  
240 owned enterprises (Ngo, Lau, & Foley, 2008).  
241 With the change in ownership structure and management practices of privatized 
 
242 companies, the relationship between employees and their organizations change as 
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well. As privatized companies reward individuals according to their contribution, 243 
employees will adopt the market pricing model – in which they view their 244 
relationship with organizations as exchanges and pay attention to the ratio 245 
between their output and input (Guthrie, 2002). Accordingly, they will expect 246 
that every effort that they contribute to the organization is fairly rewarded. 247 
Indeed, compared to SOE employees, employees of public firms and joint 248 
ventures have a stronger preference for equitable allocation based on individual 249 
contribution and a lower preference for equal allocation of outcomes (Choi & 250 
Chen, 2007; He et al., 2004). At the same time, the introduction of private 251 
owners and multinational companies downplays the status of workers in corporate 252 
governance (Hassard, Morris, & Sheehan, 2002). Indeed, the majority of workers 253 
perceive stricter management control after the reform (Chiu, 2006), and privatized 254 
organizations, such as private enterprises and joint ventures, have lower employee 255 
participation than SOEs (Chiu, 2002). As a result, employees of privatized 256 
companies may be less likely to regard themselves as ‘master’ of their organizations 257 
than SOE employees. The different relational models in SOEs and privatized 258 
companies can also be evidenced by employees’ organizational commitment. 259 
SOE employees had higher continuance commitment than employees of private 260 
enterprise (Chiu, 2002) and foreign-invested enterprises (Wang, 2004). In contrast, 261 
employees of foreign-invested enterprises perceive higher value congruence with 262 
organizations than SOE employees, due to their common interest in the exchange 263 
relationship.  264 
Overall, previous research has found a significant difference between SOEs 265 
and privatized companies in organizational practices and employee models. SOEs 266 
create a family culture and activate a communal sharing model among employees. 267 
Accordingly, SOE employees participate widely in organizational activities and 268 
develop the collective identity as ‘master of enterprises’. In contrast, privatized 269 
companies emphasize productivity and foster a market pricing schema. As a 270 
result, employees regard themselves as exchange partners of their organizations 271 
and expect fair treatment for their contribution. In the following sections, I 272 
explicate that the different relational models in SOEs and privatized companies 273 
will influence how employees react to organizational justice.  274 
Organizational Justice and Extra-Role Behavior  275 
An important indicator of employees’ contribution to their organizations is extra- 276 
role behavior (Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995). Extra-role behaviors are 277 
those that lie outside of formal role requirements, are directed toward benefitting 278 
the organization, and are not explicitly rewarded (Van Dyne et al., 1995),
[1]
 Extra- 279 
role behaviors reflect employees’ engagement with the organization and have been 280 
associated with important organizational outcomes, such as sales, efficiency, quality,  281 
and customer satisfaction (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006; Podsakoff, 282 
Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009). Indeed, it may be extra-role behaviors that 283 
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284 partly justify the existence of organizations within markets by lowering transaction 
 
285 costs and increasing coordination at little tangible cost to the firm (Coase, 1937;  
286 Williamson, 1981). Previous research has found that the ownership structure of  
287 organizations is related to different forms of extra-role behaviors that individuals  
288 perform (Farh et al., 2004). For instance, because SOEs incorporate social welfare  
289 as an indicator of organizational performance, SOE employees engage more in  
290 behaviors that are community-oriented, such as participating in social welfare, than 
 
291 non-SOE employees. On the other hand, because SOEs place a lower emphasis on 
 
292 organizational efficiency than non-SOEs, SOE employees engage less in extra-role 
 
293 behaviors that enhance organizational efficiency – such as taking initiatives and  
294 saving and protecting organizational resources – than non-SOE employees. In the  
295 current study, I take a different perspective and focus on extra-role behaviors that  
296 have been widely regarded as important to all kinds of organizations. I examine  
297 how ownership structure influences predictors of these extra-role behaviors that  
298 are essential for organizational effectiveness.  
299 I argue that ownership reform changes people’s models of their relationships  
300 with organizations, and the different relational models of employees in SOEs and  
301 privatized companies will lead them to pay attention to different organizational  
302 practices. Perceived justice is an important way through which organizational  
303 practices increase employees’ extra-role behaviors. Organizational justice includes  
304 distributive  justice  –  the  allocation  of  outcomes  according  to  individuals’  
305 performance  and  contribution  –  and  procedural  justice  –  the  fair  process  
306 of organizational decision making, such as allowing individuals to participate  
307 (Colquitt, 2001). Both distributive justice and procedural justice robustly predict  
308 employees’ motivation and extra-role behaviors (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).  
309 However, individuals don’t take all forms of justice into consideration when making 
 
310 a decision about their extra-role behaviors (Lind, 2001). Instead, they rely on the  
311 most salient form of justice in their environment to make an overall evaluation of  
312 their organization and rely on that evaluation to guide their extra-role behaviors  
313 (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 2001). Based on relational models theory (Fiske, 1992),  
314 I propose that which form of justice becomes salient in a context will depend on  
315 the relational model in that context because relational model guides individuals’  
316 information processing. Information that is consistent with the model is attended  
317 to and becomes salient, whereas information that is inconsistent with the model  
318 is ignored or downplayed (Fiske, 1992; Sanchez-Burks, Nisbett, & Ybarra, 2000).  
319 As a result, the salience of distributive justice and procedural justice in a specific  
320 context depends on the dominant relational model in that context.  
321 Based on cross-cultural research, I suggest that distributive justice is especially  
322 salient under the market pricing model, whereas procedural justice is especially  
323 salient under the communal sharing model. When people hold the market pricing  
324 model, they are primarily concerned with the ratio of their output to their input,  
325 which is exactly the definition of distributive justice (Adams, 1965). Social exchange  
326 theory suggests that individuals strive to maximize the resources they receive 
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in social exchanges, and distributive justice makes sure that individuals’ inputs 327 
into social exchange are fairly rewarded (Colquitt et al., 2013; Organ, 1990). 328 
Because distributive justice is fair distribution of outcomes, people pay attention 329 
to distributive justice when their instrumental concern is highlighted. For instance, 330 
distributive justice is especially important for countries high in materialism, such 331 
as China and Korea (Kim & Leung, 2007), or when the productivity goal is high- 332 
lighted (Chen et al., 1998). In contrast, when the relational concern is highlighted, 333 
people attend to procedural justice to make sense of their relational status. Because 334 
procedural justice, such as whether people can participate in the decision making 335 
process, carries expressive value of how people are treated in their groups and 336 
helps individuals address their relational concern (Tyler, 1989, 1994). According 337 
to the relational model of justice, procedural justice signals to individuals that they 338 
are valued members of their groups and plays an important role in enhancing em- 339 
ployee cooperation in organizations (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Procedural justice leads 340 
individuals to interpret their interactions with organizations as social relationships, 341 
rather than economic transactions (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 342 
1992), and such interpretation reinforces the communal sharing model. Empirical 343 
research also shows that procedural justice is especially important when people care 344 
about their relationships (Kwong & Leung, 2002). For instance, procedural justice is 345 
especially important for people with interdependent self-construal, i.e., those who 346 
define themselves according to their relationships (Brockner, De Cremer, van den 347 
Bos, & Chen, 2005). When their highlighted relational concerns are addressed 348 
by procedural justice, they don’t pay attention to distributive justice any more 349 
(Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki, 2000; Kwong & Leung, 2002). All 350 
of these studies suggest that procedural justice is especially salient when people are 351 
primarily concerned with relationships, whereas distributive justice plays a large 352 
role when people are primarily concerned with outcomes.  353 
The Moderation Effect of Ownership Structure  354 
In this section, I argue that the effects of organizational justice will depend on the 355 
ownership structure of organizations. As stated above, the ownership structure of 356 
organizations is associated with the dominant relational models employees hold, 357 
and the relational models will direct people’s attention to the justice practice that 358 
is consistent with the dominant model. Specifically, the communal sharing model 359 
in SOEs lead SOE employees to pay attention to procedural justice to address 360 
their relational concern, whereas the market pricing model in privatized companies 361 
will lead employees to resort to distributive justice to address their instrumental 362 
concern. Thus, the ownership structure of organizations will moderate the impact 363 
of organizational justice on individual behaviors.  364 
I propose that the communal sharing model in SOEs reinforces the importance 365 
of procedural justice in verifying employees’ collective identity. Scholars have 366 
drawn upon social identity theory to explain why procedural justice elicits 367 
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368 extra-role behaviors – described in the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 
 
369 2003). This model suggests that organization members have a need to belong to the  
370 organization and therefore identify with it (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989), and  
371 procedural justice satisfies that need because it enhances members’ sense of pride 
 
372 and respect (Tyler & Blader, 2000). I argue that this identity mechanism of justice  
373 is especially salient in highly state-owned organizations, where employees hold the 
 
374 communal sharing model and value their organizational membership. Because  
375 procedural justice enhances their pride about their organizational membership  
376 and makes them feel respected and honored in SOEs, it leads them to invest  
377 their social identities in their organizations and engage in extra-role behaviors to  
378 express that identity. Thus, employees in state-owned organizations will display a 
 
379 stronger positive reaction to procedural justice via extra-role behaviors than those 
 
380 in organizations with lower levels of state-ownership. 
 
381 Hypothesis 1: State-ownership will moderate the positive relationship between procedural justice 
 
382 and employee extra-role behaviors, such that the relationship will be stronger for employees of 
 
383 organizations with higher levels of state ownership. 
 
384 In privatized companies, where employees are more concerned about their  
385 economic outcomes, I propose that distributive justice will be a more important  
386 driver of individual extra-role behaviors than in SOEs. According to social  
387 exchange theory, both justice and extra-role behavior are social resources used in  
388 the exchange between organizations and employees, and their exchange follows  
389 the rule of reciprocity (Colquitt et al., 2013). This is consistent with the market  
390 pricing model, which matches input to output proportionally (Fiske, 1992). As  
391 employees of privatized organizations view their relationship with organizations as 
 
392 exchanges, they will match their extra-role behaviors to the outcomes received from 
 
393 their organizations. When these employees perceive the outcomes they receive  
394 from organizations to be fair, they will reciprocate by engaging in extra-role  
395 behavior. In addition, distributive justice may lead employees to increase extra-role 
 
396 behavior to exchange for outcomes they value. Although extra-role behaviors are  
397 not prescribed in role-definitions, employees deem these behaviors instrumental to 
 
398 increase their performance evaluation and promotion opportunities (Hui, Lam,  
399 & Law, 2000; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991). When people perceive  
400 their companies to be fair and believe these behaviors are reciprocated by their  
401 organizations, they are more likely to engage in extra-role behaviors (Podsakoff,  
402 MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Taken together, employees of privatized  
403 organizations will pay more attention to distributive justice to make a decision  
404 about whether to engage in extra-role behaviors than SOE employees. Therefore,  
405 I hypothesize that: 
 
406 Hypothesis 2: State-ownership will moderate the positive relationship between distributive 
 
407 justice and employee extra-role behaviors, such that the relationship will be stronger for employees 
 
408 of organizations with lower levels of state ownership. 
 
Revisiting the Relationship between Justice and Extra-Role Behavior 11  
In summary, I suggest that the reason of why employees engage in extra-role 409 
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behaviors varies with the ownership structure of organizations. SOEs activate 410 
the communal sharing model and relational concern among employees, who 411 
pay attention to procedural justice to determine whether to engage in extra-role 412 
behaviors. In contrast, privatized organizations reinforce the market pricing model 413 
and instrumental concern among employees, who resort to distributive justice to 414 
determine whether to engage in extra-role behavior. To examine these hypotheses, 415 
I first conducted a qualitative study to examine the relational models dominant 416 
in different kinds of organizations. After that, I conducted a field survey with 417 
employees from organizations with different degrees of state ownership to directly 418 
test my hypotheses.  419 
QUALITATIVE STUDY  420 
Sample and Procedure  421 
Because Fiske (1992)’s relational models are targeted to interpersonal relationships, 422 
existing measures of relational modles – such as Haslam and Fiske (1999) – 423 
are not suitable to characterize employee-organization relationships in this study. 424 
Therefore, I conducted a qualitative study to investigate the different relational 425 
models under different ownership structures. This is consistent with the qualitative 426 
methodology employed in research of relational models (Fiske, 1991). In order to 427 
understand employees’ relational models in organizations with different ownership 428 
structures, I selected four firms under the same group company, including one 429 
state-owned firm (Case 1), two public firms (Case 2 and 3), and one joint venture 430 
(Case 4). I interviewed six human resource managers from these four firms.  431 
The interviews were conducted at the managers’ offices. The interviews were 432 
designed in a semi-structured approach. First, I asked about the history of 433 
the firm and the career history and responsibilities of the manager. Second, I 434 
asked about ownership structure, organizational goals, and requested a chart of 435 
organizational structure. Third, I asked how they carry out the functions of human 436 
resource management, including recruiting, training, performance evaluation, 437 
compensation, and career management. Finally, I asked how employees construe 438 
their relationships with their company. I took notes of all interviews and recorded 439 
and transcribed the interviews for which approval was granted. The duration of 440 
interviews varied between one to two hours.  441 
Results  442 
The management practices of the four cases are summarized in Table 1. Because 443 
Case 2 and Case 3 were both public firms, and their practices were very similar, 444 
I combined them into one category. As shown in Table 1, the cases represented 445 
organizations with various degrees of state ownership. In terms of organizational 446 
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Table 1. Organizational information of state-owned enterprises, public firms, and joint ventures. 
Summary of case organizational information  
 
Case Number 1 2, 3 4 
State Ownership 100%. 47%, 45% 30% 
Organizational type SOE Public Firm Joint Venture 
Organizational goals Fealty to state, Board evaluation, Brand recognition, 
 Contribution to Continuous profit, Product quality, Market 
 economy, Harmony Functional share, Personnel 
 of top management coordination, development 
 team, Employee Industry reputation  
 satisfaction   
Board composition Party secretary, Top Party secretary, Top Delegates of parent 
 management team management companies 
  team,Independent  
  board members,  
  Union representative  
Organizational Simple Complex Simple 
structure Three functional Multiple functional Multiple functional 
 departments departments departments 
Performance No evaluation Key-Performance Goal achievement 
evaluation  Indicators Self-evaluation 
  Balanced Score Card Supervisor evaluation 
Compensation Fixed wages External Job requirements 
 No evaluation-based competitiveness Individual performance 
 bonus Internal fairness Market competitiveness 
Training Basic position training Monthly safety Externally required/ 
  training madatory training 
  Continued education Individual skill training 
  EMBA for top Education sponsorship 
  managers policy 
Participation Worker congress Worker congress Informal 
 meeting meeting communication 
 Incentive-suggestion Incentive-suggestion Incentive-suggestion 
 system system system 
    
    
 
 
 
 
447 goals, employee satisfaction was one of organizational goals in SOEs, but not in  
448 public firms or joint ventures, indicating the special employee status in SOEs.  
449 According to company law in China, limited companies with two or more state-  
450 owned investors need to have a union representative on the board to represent the  
451 interest of workers, as reflected in Cases 2 and 3. These characteristics indicate  
452 that in SOEs and public firms, employee satisfaction is an ends rather than a  
453 means to achieve organizational profit. This is different from the schema in highly 
 
454 privatized organizations, such as the joint venture. Their organizational goals  
455 focus on personnel development, which treats employees as human resources for 
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achieving organizational goals. Therefore, different organizational goals regarding 456 
employees reflect different relational models.  457 
In SOEs, employees rely on their organizations to satisfy their needs, reflecting 458 
the communal sharing schema (Fiske, 1992). An SOE manager commented about 459 
SOE employees’ loyalty (Case 1):  460 
The workers of SOEs are very loyal. They think that they belong to the firm even after death,  461 
and the firm will send them a wreath (hua quan). Our employees have a very high happiness 462 
index, and this index is even higher after they retire. If employees are hospitalized, the firm will 463 
visit them. I buy employees casualty insurance. If they get cancer, I give them 100,000 Yuan.  464 
I visit them during holidays. If an employee dies, I cover a series of services. Overall, employee 465 
loyalty is highest in SOEs, less in public firms, and even less in joint ventures.  466 
Another SOE manager commented about the organizational culture of the 467 
SOE and how it compares with the market pricing schema in joint ventures 468 
(Case 1):  469 
With the development of the times, employees of SOEs are not as committed as in the past. 470 
If the firm is performing well, people have hope. SOEs value people and give employees many 471 
opportunities, such as rotation. Although the foreign companies pay well, people have to work  472 
very hard. My friends working there admire my job.  473 
SOEs  and  public  firms  hold  annual  worker  congress  meetings,  which 474 
institutionalize employees’ participation in organizational decision making. During 475 
these meetings, top managers debrief employee representatives, who evaluate 476 
managers’ performance, express the concerns of employees, and vote on important 477 
organizational policies. A public firm manager described the procedures for 478 
employee participation (Case 2):  479 
I have a series of democratic management procedures, including employee representative meetings, 480 
evaluation of top management teams, publicity of party and administrative policies and affairs. 481 
If employees have some big problems, they may even go to the top managers.  482 
The public firms and the joint venture inherited the incentive-suggestion system 483 
(helihua jianyi) from former SOEs, in which employees provide suggestions for 484 
improving the work process and receive recognition or bonuses (in case 4) for 485 
their valuable suggestions. Yet in the joint venture, employees’ suggestions become 486 
a resource of exchange, because the division of labor is clear – managers are 487 
responsible for making decisions, and employees are to execute decisions. Their 488 
communication is mostly carried out in the informal way, in which employees 489 
directly express their concerns to their supervisors.  490 
The incentive systems are different between the three kinds of organizations 491 
I studied, reflecting different underlying relational models. In the SOE, factory 492 
managers are evaluated via financial indicators, but there is no formal performance 493 
evaluation or performance-based bonus for employees. The equality in outcomes 494 
is aligned with the solidarity goal and communal sharing schema in SOEs (Chen 495 
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496 et al., 1998). The joint venture evaluates and rewards individual performance  
497 consistent with the market pricing model. Their incentive system emphasizes not  
498 only internal equity but also external competitiveness, i.e., it ensures that employees 
 
499 are compensated for the value they create for their organizations. A joint venture  
500 manager, who was dispatched to the joint venture from an SOE in 2009, described 
 
501 the incentive system of joint ventures this way (Case 4): 
 
502 Our system is objective, scientific, and based on data and evidence. It’s not like SOE, where 
 
503 bonuses often come as surprises. The incentive system gave priority to performance in evaluation, 
 
504 reward, and promotion. The organization and managers and employees at each level set goals 
 
505 at the beginning of every year. With reference to the goals, the evaluation of employees is carried 
 
506 out every year, combining self-evaluation and supervisor evaluation. The compensation is based 
 
507 on the result of evaluation, adjusting up to 20% above or below the salary band for each level. 
 
508 The salary levels are adjusted annually for market competitiveness by comparing with market 
 
509 salary data. 
 
510 The public firms were experimenting with different evaluation and incentive  
511 systems, such as Key-Performance Indicators (KPI) and balanced score card and  
512 experiencing some tension during the transition. A public firm manager described 
 
513 the challenges that she encountered in enforcing the new incentive systems (Case  
514 3). Because the firm used to be SOE, employees still held the communal sharing  
515 model and react negatively to the management practices that contradict this  
516 model. 
 
517 I have established all the institutions relying on economic measures. However, when the (firm) 
 
518 performance is not good, I can’t enforce these institutions, because I don’t have so much money. 
 
519 SOE employees are not as qualified (su zhi) as joint venture employees, and their attitudes are 
 
520 not good. When you evaluate their performance, they think that you are going to deduct their 
 
521 wages. Therefore, I can’t do performance evaluation right now. The rules can’t rule the mass 
 
522 (fa bu ze zhong). I will hold KPI trainings this year. 
 
523 The interviews and case studies corroborated my argument that highly state-  
524 owned organizations activate a communal sharing model whereas highly privatized 
 
525 organizations reinforce a market pricing model. The evidence provided support  
526 for my theoretical argument that different relational models underlie different  
527 ownership structures. The following quantitative study further tests my hypotheses 
 
528 regarding how ownership structure moderates employees’ reactions to different  
529 justice practices. 
 
 
530 QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
 
531 Utilizing the ownership diversity of organizations in China, this study examines the 
 
532 moderating effect of state ownership on individual behaviors in a variety of firms  
533 located in Shanghai, China. The quantitative study was conducted with Shanghai  
534 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) from 
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2009 to 2010. In 2008, Shanghai SASAC supervised 40 group companies, which 535 
were composed of 3923 enterprises; the total revenue of these enterprises was 536 
equivalent to 101.49 billion US dollars, and their total profit was 1.66 billion 537 
dollars. Among the organizations under the supervision of SASAC, I selected 538 
three types of organizations with different degrees of state ownership: (1) entirely 539 
state owned, which have the most state ownership, (2) publicly-traded, which 540 
typically have a middle-level of state ownership, and (3) international joint ventures, 541 
which typically have the lowest level of state ownership. This unique design has 542 
three advantages. First, examining and comparing organizations under the same 543 
city’s governance reduces the potential influence from other contextual factors 544 
because the same state office standardizes the governance of local enterprises 545 
under its supervision (Naughton, 2005). Second, because all these firms used to 546 
be SOEs before the reform, the cross-sectional sample can provide a clue about 547 
the transition effect. Third, because the state directs and controls the transition 548 
process, the mobility and transfer of personnel between organizations is kept at a 549 
minimum. Thus, the observed relationships are more likely to be driven by change 550 
in ownership structure than personal selection.  551 
Sample and Procedure  552 
Among the 40 group companies supervised by Shanghai SASAC, four agreed 553 
to participate in my survey study. These companies covered a wide range 554 
of industries, including food, commercial, chemical, and automobile. I varied 555 
ownership structure within each industry and selected 12 firms, including four 556 
state-owned firms, three public firms, and five joint ventures. I requested 50 to 557 
100 respondents from each firm, summing up to 800 respondents from the 12 558 
firms altogether. In order to create a random sample of each firm, I requested 559 
that managers of each firm select respondents from employee rosters randomly 560 
based on the sample size that they agreed on. Finally, 721 participants returned 561 
the questionnaires, resulting in a response rate of 90%. The distribution of the 562 
sample among the three types of organizations was 282 from SOEs, 230 from 563 
public firms, and 209 from joint ventures. The hierarchical composition of the 564 
sample was 42% general employees, 28% supervisors, 21% middle managers, 565 
and 9% top managers. The respondents had an average age of 39 years and an 566 
average tenure of 13 years. In addition, 39% were females, 56% were Chinese 567 
Communist Party members, and 78.2% of the respondents had college or higher 568 
education.  569 
The questionnaire was translated from English to Chinese by the author 570 
and back translated to English by a research assistant, following the procedure 571 
suggested by Brislin (1980). In addition, the wording of the questions was discussed 572 
with a local manager to ensure that employees can understand it. Questionnaires 573 
enclosed in envelopes were distributed to employees at their workplaces, and they 574 
were informed that the survey was only for research purposes and assured of 575 
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Figure 1. (Color online) Histogram of state ownership in 12 organizations. 
 
 
576 the anonymity of their responses. They were required to seal the envelopes after  
577 completing the survey and drop the envelopes at a central location. After the survey, 
 
578 the companies returned the envelopes to the author. 
 
 
 
579 Measures 
 
580 Independent variables. I obtained the annual statistics of all the firms from the  
581 government office and calculated the degree of state ownership by the proportion of 
 
582 state-owned equity in the total equity of each organization, following the example 
 
583 of previous research (Le & Buck, 2009; Le & O’Brien, 2010). The information of  
584 state-owned equity was readily available in the government report (SASAC, 2008),  
585 and the total equity was calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. 
 
586 The distribution of state ownership in the sample is presented in Figure 1.  
587 Following the example of previous literature (Colquitt, 2001), distributive justice  
588 was measured by the extent to which the outcomes are allocated based on  
589 individual contribution. I selected a scale widely used in previous studies (Blader & 
 
590 Tyler, 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). This scale contained five items, including  
591 ‘The resources I receive are linked to how well I do my job’ and ‘In general, 
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resources are fairly allocated among employees at my organization’ (α = 0.91). 592 
Responses were made with a five-point scale (1-highly disagree, 5-highly agree).  593 
One of the most important manifestations of procedural justice is organizational 594 
members’ participation in organizational decision making (Bies & Shapiro, 1988), 595 
and the function of participation in conveying the relational value of procedural 596 
justice has been found to be cross-cultural (Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997). Therefore, 597 
I measured procedural justice with a scale asking about employees’ participation 598 
in organizational decision making (Hage & Aiken, 1969). The scale has four 599 
questions, such as ‘How frequently can you participate in the decision on the 600 
adoption of new programs?’ and ‘How frequently can you participate in decisions 601 
on the adoption of new policies?’ (1-never to 5-always, α = 0.90).  602 
Dependent variable. Since my objective is to examine extra-role behavior that is 603 
important for all types of organizations, I adopted the widely-used measure of extra- 604 
role behavior that represents individuals’ engagement with organizations (Blader & 605 
Tyler, 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). With a five-point scale ranging from 1- 606 
‘never’ to 5-‘always’, respondents rated the frequency of how often they engage in 607 
six behaviors, such as volunteering to do things that are not required in order to 608 
help the organization; putting extra effort into doing their jobs well, beyond what 609 
is normally expected; working extra hours even when they would not receive credit 610 
for doing so; and helping others with work related problems (α = 0.91).  611 
Control variables. I controlled for demographic variables including gender, education, 612 
tenure (how many years they had worked in the organization), and position in the 613 
hierarchy, which have been found to be related to extra-role behaviors in previous 614 
research (Morrison, 1994; Podsakoff et al., 2000). Gender was a dummy variable 615 
(1= Female, 0 = male), whereas the other variables were treated as continous 616 
variables. Previous research suggests that another dimention of organizational 617 
justice – the treatment individuals receive from their leaders, i.e., interactional 618 
justice – also influences their extra role behavior (Colquitt, 2001). Therefore, this 619 
study controlled for interactional justice, which was measured with a four-item scale 620 
used in previous research (Blader & Tyler, 2003a, 2003b). Respondents indicated 621 
to what extent their supervisors consider their views, respect their rights, care 622 
about employees’ well-being, and give them an explanation for the decisions made 623 
when there is a disagreement (1-highly disagree, 5-highly agree; α = 0.92). In 624 
order to rule out the alternative argument that the effect of state ownership 625 
is due to individual differences on value of groups and relationships, I also 626 
included psychological collectivism and interdependent self-construal, which have 627 
been found to either enhance extra-role behaviors (Moorman & Blakely, 1995) 628 
or moderate the effect of procedural justice (Brockner et al., 2005). Psychological 629 
collectivism is individuals’ value of groups and was measured by selecting five items  630 
with the highest loadings on each dimension of the psychological collectivism scale 631 
(Jackson, Colquitt, Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006). The selected items were: ‘I 632 
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633 preferred to work in groups rather than working alone’; ‘I felt comfortable trusting 
 
634 group members to handle their tasks’; ‘I followed the norms of groups’; ‘I was  
635 concerned about the needs of groups’; and ‘Group goals were more important 
636 to me than my personal goals’ (1-highly disagree, 5-highly agree; α = 0.85). I  
637 measured interdependent self-construal with four items with the highest loadings in  
638 the relational-interdependent self-construal scale (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000):  
639 ‘my close relationships are an important reflection of who I am’; ‘when I feel very 
 
640 close to someone, it often feels to me like that person is an important part of who  
641 I am’; ‘I think one of the most important parts of who I am can be captured by  
642 looking at my close friends and understanding who they are’; and ‘when I think of 
 
643 myself, I often think of my close friends or family also’ (1-highly disagree, 5-highly 
 
644 agree; α = 0.71). 
 
645 Results 
 
646 Firstly, I tested whether missing data was a serious problem in the sample.  
647 Missing value analysis showed that the majority of missing values occurred in  
648 the demographic variables (the number of observations for other variables ranged  
649 from 716 to 721). I divided the sample into two subsamples: one without any  
650 missing values of gender, tenure, education, and position (N = 464), and the other with at 
 
651 least one missing value (N = 255). The two subsamples did not have a significant  
652 difference on extra-role behaviors (t (458) = 1.63, p = 0.10). Therefore, missing  
653 data did not cause a serious concern. After that, I also examined whether SOEs  
654 and privatized organizations differ in age or tenure because of the different histories 
 
655 of these organizations. ANOVA results showed that SOEs, public firms, and joint 
 
656 ventures did not have a significant difference on employee age (F (2, 646) = 1.00, 
 
657 p = 0.37) or tenure (F (2, 596) = 2.65, p = 0.07).  
658 Secondly, I conducted confirmatory factor analysis to examine whether the  
659 measurement of variables was valid. The confirmatory factor analysis showed  
660 that the six-factor model, using all the items of the measured variables without 
661 parceling, fit very well with the data (χ 
2
  (390) = 1579.68, p < 0.001, CFI = 
662 0.92, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.06). In order to examine whether a substantial  
663 common method variance was present, I conducted the one-factor test as suggested  
664 in previous studies (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon, & Podsakoff, 2003). The  
665 model that loaded all the items on a common method factor did not fit the 
666 data well (χ 
2
  (405) = 7234.70, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.52, TLI = 0.48, RMSEA 
667 =  0.15), which suggested that the common method cannot account for the  
668 relationship between variables. I also compared the measurement model with  
669 several alternative models. For instance, the six-factor model fit better than a five-  
670 factor model that combined distributive justice and procedural justice (  χ 
2
 (5) = 
671 1207.72, p < 0.001) and a four-factor model that combined distributive justice, 
672 procedural justice, and leader treatment (  χ 
2
 (9) = 2172.27, p < 0.001). These  
673 comparisons suggest that distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional 
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justice measured in this study represent distinctive aspects of organizational justice. 674 
I also compared the measurement model with a five-factor model that combined 675 
psychological collectivism and interdependent self-construal, and the latter fit the 676 
data significantly worse (  χ 2 (5) = 219.49, p < 0.001), indicating that collectivism 677 
and interdependent self-construal represent distinctive aspects of cultural values. 678 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations among all the variables are 679 
presented in Table 2.  680 
Thirdly, I used the software HLM7 to test my hypotheses. Considering the 681 
nested nature of my data, I constructed a three-level hierarchical linear model to 682 
control for industry and firm effects. The results are presented in Table 3. In the 683 
intercept-only model, both firm effects and industry effects were significant, which  684 
indicated the necessity of controlling for these effects. In Model 1, I entered the 685 
demographic variables into the model. Both position and tenure had significant 686 
and positive effects on extra-role behaviors. To test my hypotheses that state 687 
ownership accentuates the effect of procedural justice (H1) and attenuates the effect 688 
of distributive justice (H2) on extra role behavior, I centered procedural justice and  689 
distributive justice around their group means and centered state-ownership around 690 
its grand mean, following the suggestion of previous research (Aguinis, Gottfredson, 691 
& Culpepper, 2013).
[2]
 In Model 2, I entered state ownership, distributive justice, 692 
and procedural justice into the model. Consistent with previous research, both 693 
distributive justice and procedural justice had significant and positive effects on 694 
extra-role behaviors. To test the moderation effect of state ownership, I entered 695 
these interaction terms in Model 3. The interaction effects significantly improved  696 
model fit (χ 2 (2) = 11.74, p = 0.003) and explained 3% of individual-level variance 697 
and 5% of industry-level variance according to the procedure suggested by Hox 698 
(2010). According to Cohen’s standard, the effect sizes were above the low level 699 
(0.02) and under the medium level (0.15). Besides the variances explained which 700 
indicate explanatory power, Aguinis et al. (2013) also recommended reporting 701 
predictive power as indicated by the coefficients of moderation effect. The 702 
interaction effect between state ownership and procedural justice (γ  = 0.30) was 703 
significant and positive, which supported H1. This effect has achieved the medium  704 
standard of effect size (Cohen, 1988). I did a simple slope analysis at one standard 705 
deviation above, at, and below the mean level of state ownership (Preacher, Curran, 706 
& Bauer, 2006) and plotted the simple slopes in Figure 2. Simple slope analysis 707 
showed that the effect of procedural justice on extra-role behaviors was positive 708 
at high (simple slope = 0.21 s.e. = 0.05, t = 4.19, p < 0.001) and medium levels 709 
(simple slope = 0.14, s.e. = 0.04, t = 3.94, p = 0.001) of state ownership, but the 710 
effect became non-significant at low level of state ownership (simple slope = 0.07, 711 
s.e. = 0.05, t = 1.58, p = 0.115).  712 
In Model 3 of Table 3, the interaction effect between state ownership and 713 
distributive justice was significant and negative; supporting H2 that state ownership 714 
attenuates the positive effect of distributive justice on extra-role behaviors. The 715 
effect size of the coefficient (γ  = -0.69) was large according to Cohen’s standard 716 
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Table 2. Correlations and descriptive statistics
a
  
 
Variables Mean SD 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
                       
 
1. State ownership 0.64 0.25 
− 0.03 
                 
 
2. Procedural Justice (Participation) 2.51 1.06  0.90                
 
3. Distributive Justice 3.51 0.71 − 0.09  0.52  0.91  
0.91 
           
 
               
 
4. Extra-role behavior 3.66 0.70 − 0.16  0.43  0.35            
.X 
 
5. Interactional justice 3.70 0.67 0.13 
 
0.41 
 
0.67 
 
0.42 
 
0.92 
        
 
−      
0.85 
      
 
             
 
6. Psychological collectivism 3.97 0.52 − 0.12  0.31  0.42  0.56  0.49        
Chen 
 
8. Female 0.39 0.49 0.04  0.24  0.13  0.13  0.10  0.02  0.03      
−            
7. Interdependent self-construal 3.58 0.55  0.04 − 0.23 − 0.32 − 0.35 − 0.30 − 0.46 − 0.71       
9. Education 3.31 1.12 
 
0.08 0.19 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.07 
 
0.01 
   
 
−  −     −     
10. Position 1.96 1.00 0.04 
 
0.46 0.18 
 
0.27 
 
0.18 
 
0.16 
 
0.14 0.12 
 
0.36 
 
−       −   
11. Tenure 13.29 9.75 0.00 
 
0.04 
 
0.11 
 
0.04 
 
0.17 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 0.08 
 
0.320.11 
 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
− −                   
 
                         
Notes: 
a
 Entries on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alphas. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. For position, 1 = Employee, 2= Supervisor, 3 = Middle manager, 4 = Top manager. 
For education, 1 = Middle school, 2 = High school, 3 = College, 4 = Bachelor, 5 = Master or higher. 
p < 0.05; p < 0.01 
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Table 3. Hierarchical linear models of extra-role behavior  
 
   Intercept-only model   Model 1    Model 2     Model 3     Model 4  
 
                      
 
DV: Extra-role behavior b s.e p  b s.e p b s.e p  b s.e p  b s.e p 
 
                  
 
Intercept 3.63 0.12 <0.001 3.18 0.15 <0.001 3.23 0.14 <0.001  3.19 0.14 <0.001  3.26 0.12 <0.001 
 
State ownership     
− 0.08 
   − 0.36 0.22 0.138 − 0.36 0.22 0.137 − 0.39 0.17 0.058 
 
Female     0.06 0.15 − 0.03 0.06 0.58 − 0.04 0.06 0.533 − 0.06 0.05 0.279 
 
Education    0.04 0.03 0.22  0.06 0.03 0.048  0.07 0.03 0.016  0.07 0.03 0.015 
 
Position    0.15 0.03 <0.001 0.07 0.03 0.038  0.07 0.03 0.041  0.05 0.03 0.094 
 
Tenure    0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.003 
 
PJ           0.13 0.04 <0.001  0.14 0.04 <0.001  0.13 0.03 <0.001 
 
PJ  state ownership              0.30 0.14 0.038  0.32 0.13 0.013 
 
DJ          0.14 0.05 0.003  0.13 0.05 0.005 − 0.08 0.05 0.12 
 
DJ  state ownership             
− 
0.69 0.20 <0.001 
− 
0.79 0.19 <0.001 
 
Interactional justice                 0.12 0.06 0.027                    
 
Collectivism                   0.46 0.06 <0.001 
 
ISC                    0.10 0.05 0.04 
 
Collectivism  DJ                  − 0.07 0.08 0.382  
Collectivism  PJ 
                 
0.07 0.06 0.231 
 
                 
− 
 
ISC  DJ                  0.14 0.08 0.082                    
 
ISC  PJ                  
− 
0.02 0.06 0.704 
 
                       
 
Random part  Var p   Var p  Var p   Var p   Var p 
 
σ 2 individual  0.43    0.36    0.33     0.32     0.26  
 
σ 2 firm  0.03 <0.001  0.02 <0.001  0.02 <0.001   0.02 <0.001   0.01 0.004 
 
σ 2 industry  0.04 0.002  0.02 0.011  0.01 0.013   0.01 0.016   0.00 0.086 
 
R
2
 individual      0.17    0.09     0.03     0.19  
 
R
2
 firm      0.43    0.15     0     0.42  
 
R
2
 industry      0.57    0.16     0.05     0.69  
 
Deviance  1460.35(4)   858.98(8)    811.70(11)     799.96(13)     699.79(20)  
 
                        
 
                          
Notes: ISC=Interdependent Self-Construal. DJ= Distributive justice. PJ= Procedural justice (participation). For position, 1 = Employee, 2= Supervisor, 3 = Middle manager, 4 = Top 
manager. For education, 1 = Middle school, 2 = High school, 3 = College, 4 = Bachelor, 5 = Master or higher. 
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Figure 2. The interaction effect of procedural justice and state ownership on extra-role behavior. 
 
 
717 (above 0.50) (Cohen, 1988). The results of simple slope analysis are presented in  
718 Figure 3. Distributive justice had a positive effect on extra-role behaviors among  
719 organizations with medium (simple slope = 0.13, s.e. = 0.05, t = 2.83, p = 0.005) or 
 
720 low levels (simple slope = 0.29, s.e. = 0.06, t = 4.54, p < 0.001) of state ownership. 
 
721 At high level of state ownership, distributive justice did not have a significant effect  
722 on extra-role behaviors (simple slope = -0.03, s.e. = 0.07, t = -0.43, p = 0.66). 
 
723 Finally, I conducted robustness checks to test whether the moderation effects  
724 of state ownership are driven by individual differences on collectivism and  
725 interdependent self-construal. To achieve that objective, I first tested whether  
726 state ownership was associated with cultural values. I regressed cultural values on 
 
727 state ownership in hierarchical linear models. After controlling for demographic  
728 variables, state ownership did not have a significant effect on psychological  
729 collectivism (b = -0.05, s.e. = 0.16, p = 0.76) or interdependent self-construal (b 
 
730 = 0.00, s.e. = 0.11, p = 0.99). Therefore, state ownership was not systematically  
731 related with individual difference in cultural values. Next, I entered cultural values  
732 and their interaction effects with distributive justice and procedural justice in the  
733 model. In Model 4 of Table 3, both psychological collectivism and interdependent  
734 self-construal  had  a  significant  and  positive  effect  on  extra  role  behavior.  
735 Controlling for these effects and their moderating effects, the hypothesized  
736 interaction effects remained significant. It indicates that the moderation effects  
737 of  state  ownership  were  not  due  to  individual  differences  on  collectivism,  
738 interdependent self-construal, or their interaction effects with justice. I also tested 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The interaction effect of distributive justice and state ownership on extra-role behavior.  
whether the hypothesized interaction effects were robust after controlling for the 739 
effect of interactional justice. Interactional justice had a positive effect on extra- 740 
role behavior, and this effect was not moderated by state ownership (b = -0.35, 741 
s.e. = 0.23, p = 0.12). After controlling for the main effect of interactional justice, 742 
the hypothesized moderation effects remained significant.
[3]
 Therefore, the results 743 
were robust to individual difference in cultural values and interactional justice 744 
individuals receive. 745 
DISCUSSION 746 
Drawing on the institutional diversity in the reform context of China, this study 747 
demonstrates that ownership structure moderates the effects of justice on extra- 748 
role behavior. Specifically, distributive justice is positively associated with extra 749 
role behavior in privatized organizations but has no effect (or even negative 750 
effect after controlling for individual values and interactional justice) in highly 751 
state-owned organizations. In contrast, participation in decision making – a key 752 
component of procedural justice – is positively associated with extra-role behavior 753 
in organizations with high and medium levels of state ownership, but its effect 754 
became non-significant in highly privatized companies. The moderation effect 755 
of state ownership is not reducible to individual difference in cultural values. 756 
Therefore, the findings support my proposal that employees pay attention to the 757 
form of justice that is consistent with their relational schema to guide their extra 758 
role behavior. 759 
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760 The findings also indicate that the effect of state ownership on employee  
761 behavior depends  on perceived  justice. Specifically,  employees of privatized  
762 organizations demonstrate less extra-role behavior than SOE employees when  
763 distributive justice is low, whereas SOE employees engage in less extra-role  
764 behavior than employees of privatized organizations when they perceive low  
765 procedural justice or high distributive justice. In other words, people react  
766 negatively when their dominant relational schema is not verified, but people in  
767 different organizations react differently to practices that are inconsistent with their 
 
768 schemas, depending on whether such practice is irrelevant or contradictory to  
769 their schemas. Since participation is irrelevant to privatized companies’ market  
770 pricing schema, it is ignored by their employees, and their extra-role behavior is  
771 not reduced. In contrast, distributive justice is not only inconsistent with SOEs’  
772 communal sharing schema, it contradicts that schema by undermining the equal  
773 status of employees. As a result, employees of SOEs engage in less extra-role  
774 behavior than privatized companies when distributive justice is high. 
 
 
775 Theoretical Contributions 
 
776 This study makes important theoretical contributions to multiple literatures.  
777 First, this study contributes to research on the micro-foundations of corporate  
778 governance. Research on corporate governance has called for more attention to  
779 the role of labor and research on the transition economies (Aguilera & Jackson,  
780 2010; Fiss, 2008). Many countries’ SOEs have employee representatives on board  
781 (World Bank, 2014), and even more organizations have various forms of worker  
782 participation, such as employee stock ownership plans (Doucouliagos, 1995).  
783 This study suggests that these organizations should pay attention to the unique  
784 relational schema triggered by these institutions. Increasing labor representation  
785 in corporate governance can change the nature of how employees relate to their  
786 organizations. Employees will regard themselves as owners of organizations and  
787 attend to participation opportunities to verify their owner identity. Meanwhile,  
788 they will be less sensitive to the outcomes they receive. Therefore, even minor and 
 
789 symbolic change in corporate governance can have far-reaching implications for  
790 employee motivation.  
791 In  addition,  I  offer  a  theory  of  the  micro  foundations  of  institutional  
792 transition. I find that the relationship between perceived justice and individual  
793 behavior  depends  upon  ownership  structure  and,  likewise,  the  relationship  
794 between ownership structure and individual behavior depends upon justice  
795 perceptions.  Thus,  the  favored  variables  of  micro  and  macro  scholars  do  
796 not work independently – they combine interactively to influence individual  
797 behaviors. I found that ownership structure is not associated with different  
798 levels of employee motivation (Burawoy & Lukacs, 1985), but rather associated  
799 with different predictors of employee motivation. This finding helps explain  
800 the mixed results on the transition effect. Since the transition effect depends 
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on  how  people  perceive  organizational  practices,  the  method  of  transition 801 
may greatly influence its effectiveness. For instance, previous research found 802 
that non-state controlled firms are more likely to enhance post-transformation 803 
performance than state-controlled companies (Li, Xia, Long, & Tan, 2012). One 804 
explanation is that removing state control can change the relational schema of 805 
employees and facilitate their adaptation to new organizational practices after 806 
transition.  807 
Furthermore, this study discovers a boundary condition of the well-established 808 
effects of organizational justice. Previous research has proposed at least two 809 
reasons  for  why  justice  is  important  –  instrumental  reason  represented  by 810 
social exchange theory and relational reason represented by social identity 811 
theory. The current study suggests that justice is important for different reasons 812 
under different organizational contexts, and distributive justice and procedural 813 
justice are differentially positioned to serve people’s instrumental or relational 814 
needs. Specifically, when organizational contexts foster a communal sharing 815 
schema, the function of procedural justice in satisfying individuals’ relational 816 
needs  and  verifying  their  social  identity  is  especially  important.  In  these 817 
contexts, the well-established positive effect of distributive justice becomes non- 818 
significant or even reversed. In contrast, when organizational contexts emphasize 819 
productivity and efficiency, distributive justice plays an important role in fulfilling 820 
people’s instrumental motive. Therefore, this study highlights the importance 821 
of organizational context and its underlying relational model as factors that 822 
shape why people care about justice and which aspect of justice people care 823 
about.  824 
Finally,  this  study  contributes  to  cross-cultural  research  by  highlighting 825 
the importance of organizational context and relational model in activating 826 
cultural knowledge and guiding individual behaviors. Cross-cultural research has 827 
investigated how national differences in cultural values influence individuals’ 828 
reactions to justice (Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen, & Lowe, 2009). However, studies 829 
relying on different cultural values generate conflicting predictions regarding how 830 
people within the same culture react to justice. For instance, since Chinese are 831 
high on both materialism and interdependent self-construal, both distributive 832 
justice and procedural justice should be important for them (Brockner et al., 833 
2000; Brockner et al., 2005; Kim & Leung, 2007). At the same time, because 834 
Chinese people are high in power distance and traditional values, justice – 835 
especially procedural justice – should be less important for them (Brockner et al., 836 
2001; Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997; Kim & Leung, 2007). These contradictions 837 
are not specific to China. Given that power distance and collectivism are 838 
highly correlated with each other (Hofstede, 2001), it would be challenging 839 
to predict whether justice is more or less important for a particular culture. 840 
Fiske  (1992)  argued  that  all  cultures  share  the  four  relational  schemas in 841 
social relationships. Indeed, the correlations between collectivism values and 842 
relational models are generally small (Realo, Kästik, & Allik, 2004; Vodosek, 843 
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844 2009). It is the specific context within a culture that determines which relational  
845 model is salient. As found in this study, organizational context provides a  
846 better prediction about organizational members’ reaction to justice than cultural  
847 values. 
 
 
848 Implications for Management Practices 
 
849 First, this study generates important implications for applying justice practices.  
850 This study suggests that distributive justice is especially suitable for satisfying  
851 instrumental need, whereas procedural justice is especially important for satisfying 
 
852 relational need. Thus, organizations may emphasize different aspects of justice  
853 under different organizational agenda. If organizations aim to achieve high  
854 productivity, they should emphasize distributive justice and use practices such  
855 as performance evaluations and pay for performance. If organizations want to  
856 solicit employee identification, they should emphasize procedural justice and  
857 establish  institutions  for employees  to participate  in  organizational  decision  
858 making.  
859 In addition, this study generates new insights for transition economies such  
860 as China by emphasizing the perspective of employees in reform design. The  
861 institutions of state ownership cultivated a communal sharing schema among  
862 SOE employees. As a consequence, they do not react positively to distributive  
863 practices such as pay for performance because it contradicts their identity as  
864 enterprise masters. Therefore, managers and policymakers should recognize this  
865 relational schema while changing the incentive system of SOEs. Just as the  
866 manager in Case 3 did, managers should transform employees’ relational schemas 
 
867 through training and communication before implementing practice change. At  
868 the same time, this sense of ownership can be regarded as a unique legacy  
869 of SOEs and be leveraged to their transformation. Reform methods such as  
870 profit sharing and employee stock ownership can protect employees’ collective  
871 identity and reinforce its motivating force. In addition, the reform process should  
872 also preserve SOE employees’ social identity by inviting them to participate in  
873 the design and implementation of the reform. If the reform simply privatizes  
874 SOEs and discharges workers without recognizing their relational schema, the  
875 reform will encounter unforeseen resistance and lose the motivational legacy of  
876 SOEs. 
 
 
877 Limitations and Future Research 
 
878 Despite the important contributions, this study has some limitations. First, although 
 
879 the degree of state ownership was measured with archival data, the measurement of 
 
880 justice and extra-role behaviors may be subject to common-method bias. However, 
 
881 ‘in the absence of true effects, it is extremely unlikely for common-method  
882 variance to generate significant cross-level interactions. In fact, if a true cross-level 
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interaction exists, common-method variance tends to lower the likelihood of its 883 
identification’ (Lai, Li, & Leung, 2013: 243). Therefore, the findings of cross-level 884 
interactions argue against a common-method variance explanation. Furthermore, 885 
common-method variance cannot explain the existence of non-significant simple 886 
slopes. If common method bias was driving the results, it would have caused 887 
all the relationships between justice and extra-role behaviors to be significant. 888 
Nonetheless, future research should measure behaviors with another source and 889 
corroborate the results.  890 
Second,  although  I  have  conducted  qualitative  studies  to  investigate  the 891 
relational schemas under different ownership structures, I did not measure 892 
relational models in the quantitative study. The primary reason for this limitation 893 
is because the existing scales are targeted to interpersonal relationships and 894 
not suitable for the current study. This limitation makes it difficult to rule out 895 
alternative explanations. For instance, one might argue that it’s the authority 896 
ranking relational schema in SOEs that constrains participation opportunities in 897 
SOEs, which further makes participation especially scarce and important for SOE 898 
employees. This alternative explanation is not consistent with previous research 899 
and theory. Previous research found non-significant difference in hierarchical 900 
organizational culture between SOEs and privatized companies, such as foreign- 901 
controlled enterprises (Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). 902 
Relational models theory (Fiske, 1992) predicts that people attend to information 903 
consistent with their relational schema and behave accordingly. Under the 904 
authority ranking schema, employees will not expect participation opportunities 905 
but instead simply comply with their authorities. Thus, they will not pay attention 906 
to participation opportunities to guide their extra-role behavior. This alternative 907 
explanation does not fit well with the data either. My qualitative studies indeed 908 
found the widespread participation opportunities enjoyed by SOE employees, and 909 
my quantitative study didn’t find a negative correlation between state ownership 910 
and participation. Therefore, it is not very likely that this explanation can explain 911 
the findings. Future research should develop scales of relational schemas for 912 
employee-organization relationships and directly test the moderating effects of 913 
relational schema.  914 
Another limitation is that the cross-sectional study could not make causal 915 
argument about the observed relationships. However, the unique design of this 916 
study reduces the likelihood of reverse causality. In the sample design, all the 917 
organizations used to be SOEs, and the majority of the participants used to be SOE 918 
employees. Because the reform in Shanghai was carried forward with close state 919 
control, the labor transfer between organizations during transition was controlled 920 
by the state and kept at a minimum level. Thus, the different relationships between 921 
justice and extra-role behaviors observed in different organizations are more 922 
attributable to ownership change than individual self-selection. Future research 923 
can employ longitudinal study to track individual behaviors during the reform and 924 
corroborate my findings.  925 
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926 CONCLUSION 
 
927 Drawing on the institutional diversity during ownership reform in China, this  
928 study shows that the ownership structure of organizations influences why people  
929 care about justice and which aspect of justice people value. In state-owned  
930 organizations, the socialist legacy activates a communal sharing schema among  
931 employees and renders participation an important factor for verifying their  
932 social identity. As the privatization reform emphasizes productivity and efficiency, 
 
933 employees of privatized organizations construe their relationships with their  
934 organizations as social exchanges and pay close attention to equitable allocation  
935 of outcomes. Therefore, policymakers and managers should acknowledge the  
936 different schemas activated by different ownership structures and design reform  
937 methods and management practices creatively. 
 
 
938 NOTES 
 
939 I want to thank Batia M. Wiesenfeld, Gino Cattani, Elizabeth W. Morrison, and Steven L. Blader 
940 et al. for their generous help and great suggestions on previous versions of the article. I also want to 
941 thank editor Ray Friedman and the anonymous reviewers for their great suggestions and comments. 
942 I highly appreciate the resources provided by Doug Guthrie and Zhixing Xiao and administrative 
943 support of Shanghai State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
944 [1]  A critical subset of extra-role behaviors are organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB’s; Van 
945 Dyne et al., 1995). The present research is designed to explore extra-role behaviors but, in some  
946 instances, the literature that I draw upon focuses on specific categories of extra-role behaviors,  
947 especially OCB’s. 
948 [2]  The results are in the same pattern when centering distributive justice and procedural justice on 
949 their grand means. 
950 [3]  After controlling for the effects of interactional justice and cultural values, the simple slope of 
951 procedural justice did not change much. The simple slope of distributive justice was significantly  
952 positive when degree of state ownership was lower than 0.37 and became significantly negative  
953 when the degree of state ownership was higher than 0.67. 
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